Showing 1 - 10 of 44
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010234077
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009312713
Psychological pressure affects performance. This is especially true for individuals completing precision tasks in decisive situations, such as assessment tests, job talks, or sports competitions. In this paper, I shed light on detrimental effects of pressure on performance, a phenomenon known as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762429
Entry decisions in market entry games usually depend on the belief about how many others are entering the market, the belief about the own rank in a real effort task, and subjects' risk preferences. In this paper I am able to replicate these basic results and examine two further dimensions: (i)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009774194
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000844667
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013407955
Rankings are a pervasive feature of the finance industry. Although they have no direct monetary consequences, rankings provide utility for intrinsic (positive self-image) and extrinsic (status) reasons. We recruit a unique subject pool of 204 financial professionals and investigate how anonymous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011417442
Time preferences drive decisions in many economic situations, such as investment contexts or salary negotiations. These situations are characterized by a very short time frame for decision making. Preferences are potentially susceptible to the confounding effects of time pressure, as proposed by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011523286
A pervasive feature in the finance industry is relative performance, which can include extrinsic (money), intrinsic (self-image), and reputational (status) motives. In this paper, we model a portfolio decision with two assets and investigate how reputational motives (i.e., the public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012001790
We utilize a laboratory experiment to compare effort provision under optimal tournament contracts with different distributions of prizes which motivate agents to compete to be first, avoid being last, or both. We find that the combined tournament contract incorporating both incentives at the top...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337036