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This paper examines the effect that a country's business regulatory environment has on the amount of foreign direct investment it attracts. We use the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business ranking to capture the costs that firms face when operating in a country. Several interesting results emerge....
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This paper contributes to the aid effectiveness debate by applying a vector autoregression model to a panel of Sub-Saharan African countries. This method avoids the need for instrumental variables and allows one to analyse the impact of foreign aid on human development and on economic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009731747
This paper examines the effect that experiencing corruption has on an individual's mental health using microeconomic data from the Afrobarometer surveys. The results show a statistically significant and economically meaningful effect in both binary and ordered probit models using both an...
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Experimental studies have shown that deterrence (monitoring and punishment) can be an effective anti-corruption policy. • Even when they themselves stand to lose, policymakers may enact deterrence policies with real teeth… • … However, policymakers’ legitimacy is crucial: a given...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011647621
In our framed laboratory experiment, two Public Officials, A and B, make consecutive decisions regarding embezzlement from separate funds. Official B observes Official A’s decision before making their own. There are four treatments: three with deterrence and one without. We find a peer effect...
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We analyse policy makers' incentives to fight corruption under different institutional qualities. We find that 'public officials', even when non-corrupt, significantly distort anti-corruption institutions by choosing a lower detection probability when this probability applies to their own...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011517268