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Bank capital regulation seems to be today's most accepted regulatory instrument. The reasoning is that limited liability and deposit insurance appear to give banks incentives for excessive risk-taking. Capital requirements can alleviate this problem as banks are obliged to hold more capital...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011474803
We study optimal capital requirement regulation in a dynamic quantitative model in which nonfinancial firms, as well as households, hold deposits. Firms hold deposits for precautionary reasons and to facilitate the acquisition of production inputs. Our theoretical analysis identifies a novel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012132611
I study the relation between shadow banking and financial stability in an economy in which banks are susceptible to self-fulfilling runs and in which government-backed deposit insurance is limited. Shadow banks issue only uninsured deposits while commercial banks issue both insured and uninsured...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012135982
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This paper tests whether an increase in insured deposits causes banks to become more risky. We use variation introduced by the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, which increased the deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor and bank. For some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061062
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This paper analyzes the influence of market discipline on the risk-taking incentives of banks. It is shown that market discipline reduces risk if banks can credibly commit to a given level of risk before the interest rate on deposits is set. If, however, the bank can readjust the level of risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398285
We investigate a banking system subject to repeated macroeconomic shocks and show that without deposit rate control, the banking system collapses with certainty. Any initial level of reserves will delay the collapse but not avoid it. Even without a banking collapse, the economy still converges...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011399268
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011531968
This paper estimates the funding advantage afforded by the joint liability scheme to German Landesbanken. The advantage is estimated by computing the difference between Moody's baseline credit assessment (BCA), representing the stand-alone rating, and the adjusted BCA incorporating group support...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011302433