We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while both can be incentive compatible in FPSB if the auction...

We experimentally examine the effectiveness of antitrust policies against bidding rings in theEnglish auction (EN) and the first-price sealed-bid auction (FP). We consider both traditionalantitrust policy (without a leniency program) and modern antitrust policy (with a leniencyprogram). In EN,...

Using laboratory experiments, we compare the stability of bidding rings in the English auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction in a heterogeneous-value setting. In both a re-matching condition and a fixed-matching condition, we observe that biddings rings are more stable in the English...

Many auctions and procurement contests entail nontrivial bidding costs, which makes the bidders’ participation decisions endogenous to the auction design. We analyze the effect of different auction rules on potential bidders’ incentives to participate. We focus on first-price auctions with...

The present paper examines the joint effect of fixed-term employment and work organization on job satisfaction using individual-level data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Specifically, we analyze whether workers who are heterogeneous in terms of the type of working contract...

Using the first wave of the UK Household Longitudinal Survey, we investigate the extent to which deficiency at English as measured by English as Additional Language (EAL), contribute to the immigrant-native wage gap for female employees in the UK, after controlling for age, region of residence,...