We examine the issue of the appropriate selection of macroprudential instruments according to the vulnerabilities identified and the policymakers' objectives using a version of the 3D DSGE model following Mendicino et al. (2020) and Hinterschweiger et al. (2021) calibrated for the euro area. We...

After the destructive impact of the global financial crisis of 2008, many believe that pre-crisis financial market regulation did not take the "big picture" of the system suffciently into account and, subsequently, financial supervision mainly "missed the forest for the trees". As a result, the...

In standard Walrasian macro-finance models, pecuniary externalities such as fire sales lead to overinvestment in illiquid assets or underprovision of liquidity. We investigate whether imperfect competition (Cournot) improves welfare through internalizing the externality and find that this is far...

We set out a stylised framework for the policies enacted to address the risks posed by systemically important institutions (SIIs) and to counter the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) problem, examining conceptually how far supervisory and resolution policies are complementary or substitutable. The...

This paper studies leverage regulation and monetary policy when equity investors and/or creditors have distorted beliefs relative to a planner. We characterize how the optimal leverage regulation responds to arbitrary changes in investors' and creditors' beliefs and relate our results to...

This occasional paper describes how the financial stability and macroprudential policy functions are organised at the ECB. Financial stability has been a key policy function of the ECB since its inception. Macroprudential policy tasks were later conferred on the ECB by the Single Supervisory...