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Communicating subjective evaluations
Lang, Matthias - 2012 - this version: August 2013
Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? In this paper the principal's evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. I show that the principal explains her evaluation to the agent if the evaluation turns out to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569527
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Beyond information : disclosure, distracted attention, and investor behavior
Hillenbrand, Adrian; Schmelzer, André - 2015 - Working paper version: December 2015
Financial disclosure documents provide investors with product details to facilitate informed investment decisions. We … investigate whether the appearance - the visual frame - of disclosure documents impacts risk and return expectations and … visual frame. Results are in line with the distracted attention mechanism and suggest that disclosure policies should take …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011416914
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Strategic communication with reporting costs
Fluet, Claude; Emons, Winand - 2016
by selective disclosure of facts. As is well known from the literature, competition between the informed parties …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011419483
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Disclosure of stress test results
Berlin, Mitchell - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349499
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Effects of early patent disclosure on knowledge dissemination : evidence from the pre-grant publication system introduced in the United States
Okada, Yoshimi; Nagaoka, Sadao - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349860
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Loss potential and disclosures related to credit derivatives : a cross-country comparison of corporate bond funds under US and German regulation
Gałkiewicz, Dominika - 2014 - This version: August 2014
restricting the speculative use of derivatives by funds to a reasonable level, as well as implement more standardized disclosure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010530827
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Receiver's access fee for a single sender
Gregor, Martin - 2014
We study a game in which a sender with verifiable private information has to pay an access fee that is announced by a receiver to be able to convey her message to the receiver. The setting is motivated by the literature of pay-and-lobby politics, which finds that politicians decide to schedule...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358351
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Communicating subjective evaluations
Lang, Matthias - 2014
Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? Suppose the principal's evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. If she does not provide justification, her message space is restricted, but the message is costless. I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361447
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Reputational bidding
Giovannoni, Francesco; Makrēs, Miltiadēs - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010362561
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Bayesian persuasion by stress test disclosure : conference pape
Gick, Wolfgang; Pausch, Thilo - 2013
continuum of receivers. We find that banking supervisors create welfare as optimal disclosure reduces uncertainty and leads to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339955