Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 130,088
Cover Image
Sweet lemons : mitigating collusion in organizations
Pollrich, Martin; Negenborn, Colin von - 2018
This paper shows that the possibility of collusion between an agent and a supervisor imposes no restrictions on the set of implementable social choice functions (SCF) and associated payoff vectors. Any SCF and any payoff profile that are implementable if the supervisor's information was public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011902729
Cover Image
Partial collusion with asymmetric cross-price effects
Savorelli, Luca - 2010
Asymmetries in cross-price elasticities have been demonstrated by several empirical studies. In this paper we study from a theoretical stance how introducing asymmetry in the substitution effects influences the sustainability of collusion. We characterize the equilibrium of a linear Cournot...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011737876
Cover Image
Private monitoring, collusion and the timing of information
Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Scott, Troy J. - 2013
When the information used by a principal to monitor an agent is private, and thus non-verifiable by a third party, the principal has a credibility issue with the agent. The agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information in order to collect a monetary penalty from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010212662
Cover Image
Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship
Fiocco, Raffaele; Gilli, Mario - 2014
We investigate regulation as the outcome of a bargaining process between a regulator and a regulated firm. The regulator is required to monitor the firm's costs and reveal its information to a political principal (Congress). In this setting, we explore the scope for collusion between the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371305
Cover Image
Polycentric governance in collusive agreements
Schmal, Wolfgang Benedikt - 2024
within a cartel, has received surprisingly low attention. Using a comprehensive dataset of 191 cartels from 2012 - 2018, this … paper empirically reveals that polycentric structures within the cartel governance may contribute to longer duration and … environment. The insights may be helpful for cartel authorities and new research combining institutional and industrial economics. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014481223
Cover Image
Exit options and the allocation of authority
Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel - 2013
We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781380
Cover Image
The role of credit rationing and collateral in debt financing
Houben, Eike; Nippel, Peter - 2001
Credit rationing and the use of collateral are widely observed in debt financing. To our view there is yet no appropriate theoretical explanation for these facts. In the standard debt financing models the occurrence of credit rationing can be explained based on suitable assumptions. But those...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011281514
Cover Image
Exit options and the allocation of authority
Bester, Helmut; Krähmer, Daniel - 2013
We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752337
Cover Image
From overt to tacit collusion
Hinloopen, Jeroen; Soetevent, Adriaan - 2008
significantly decreased cartel activity. The design of these repeated game experiments however is such that engaging in illegal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376529
Cover Image
Signaling and tacit collusion in an in finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Harrington, Joseph Emmett; Zhao, Wei - 2011 - August 2010, Revised May 2011
In the context of an infinitely repeated Prisoners.Dilemma, we explore how cooperation is initiated when players signal and coordinate through their actions. There are two types of players - patient and impatient - and a player's type is private information. An impatient type is incapable of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009486361