Showing 1 - 10 of 104
This paper addresses a general problem with surveys asking agents for their assessment of the state of the economy: answers are highly dependent on information that is publicly available, while only information that is not already publicly known has the potential to improve a professional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012232123
for wealth inequality and welfare. We employ a frictionless two-sectoral macroeconomic model with a housing sector to … investigate the dynamics of wealth inequality and the determinants of welfare. Households have non-homothetic preferences … inequality by about 0.7 percentage points (measured by top 10 percent share). Average welfare increases by about 0.5 percent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012310716
knowledge. We test this result in a laboratory experiment. The data cannot confirm the predicted welfare dominance of private …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012422494
customers' information might actually lead to welfare losses. Further, we highlight the supremacy of the assumption regarding …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012286246
Why do people appear to forgo information by sorting into “echo chambers”? We construct a highly tractable multi-sender, multi-receiver cheap talk game in which players choose with whom to communicate. We show that segregation into small, homogeneous groups can improve everybody’s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012265620
The standard agency model assumes that the agent does not care how his decisions influence others. This is a strong assumption, which we relax. We find that, although monetary incentives are effective also with sociallyattentive agents, the principal may optimally set none. This could explain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012268393
I present a novel experimental design to measure lying and mistrust as continuous variables on an individual level. My experiment is a sender-receiver game framed as an investment game. It features two players: firstly, an advisor with complete information (i.e., the sender) who is incentivized...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012424302
We study a credence goods problem - that is, a moral hazard problem with non-contractible outcome - where altruistic experts (the agents) care both about their income and the utility of consumers (the principals). Experts' preferences over income and their consumers' utility are convex, such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431181
The present study contributes to the ongoing debate on possible costs and benefits of insider trading. We present a novel call auction model with insider information. Our model predicts that more insider information improves informational efficiency of prices, but this comes at the expense of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012437539
Freelancing human experts play an important role in Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). Expert ratings partially reflect the reciprocal network of ICO members and analysts. Ratings predict ICO success, but highly imperfectly so. Favorably rated ICOs tend to fail when more ratings reciprocate prior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013336270