Why do people appear to forgo information by sorting into “echo chambers”? We construct a highly tractable multi-sender, multi-receiver cheap talk game in which players choose with whom to communicate. We show that segregation into small, homogeneous groups can improve everybody’s...

We study a credence goods problem - that is, a moral hazard problem with non-contractible outcome - where altruistic experts (the agents) care both about their income and the utility of consumers (the principals). Experts' preferences over income and their consumers' utility are convex, such...

The present study contributes to the ongoing debate on possible costs and benefits of insider trading. We present a novel call auction model with insider information. Our model predicts that more insider information improves informational efficiency of prices, but this comes at the expense of...

Freelancing human experts play an important role in Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). Expert ratings partially reflect the reciprocal network of ICO members and analysts. Ratings predict ICO success, but highly imperfectly so. Favorably rated ICOs tend to fail when more ratings reciprocate prior...

We study the role of information about the multiplier in a finitely repeated investment game. A high multiplier increases the reputational incentives of a trustee, leading to more repayments. Our perfect Bayesian equilibrium analysis shows that if the trustee is privately informed about the...

Credence goods markets, such as those for car repairs and medical treatments, are generally characterized by an ex-ante and ex-post information asymmetry between the uninformed buyer and the informed seller. Previous literature demonstrates that efficiency and fraud in a monopolist credence...

The standard agency model assumes that the agent does not care how his decisions influence others. This is a strong assumption, which we relax. We find that, although monetary incentives are effective also with sociallyattentive agents, the principal may optimally set none. This could explain...

I present a novel experimental design to measure lying and mistrust as continuous variables on an individual level. My experiment is a sender-receiver game framed as an investment game. It features two players: firstly, an advisor with complete information (i.e., the sender) who is incentivized...

The aim of the paper is to present a comparative analysis of the diffusion of ?flexible contractual arrangements' (FCA) across the European Union (EU). The homonymous FCA Composite Indicator (CI) is calculated for all 200 NUTS II-level regions of France, Germany, the UK, Denmark, Sweden,...

In this paper we study how the determinants of regional commuting in Italy have evolved in the past fifteen years. Using labour force data from 1992 to 2008 we estimate a model where the probability of commuting is regressed on a wide set of individual, job, firm and regional characteristics....