We develop a model of a city populated by heterogeneous agents. Agents self-select into entrepreneurship, and entrepreneurs set up firms which hire workers. We characterize the equilibrium matching between firms and workers, as well as the within-city assignment of agents to locations. We then...

According to static models of industrial organization, a rise in competition decreases prices. In this paper, I test whether this conclusion can be reversed in the mobile telecommunications markets where dynamic efficiency effects might be significant. The empirical test relies on the change in...

We develop a monopolistic-competition model of closed two-sector one-factor economy, where agents are (continuously) heterogeneous in their entrepreneurship abilities and choose between being employees or entrepreneurs. The sufficient conditions in terms of variable elasticity of substitution...

This paper presents a critical analysis of the SSG and a simulation of its effects for Brazilian sugar exports to countries such as the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) bloc. A first stage involved the identification of tariff lines (TL) for the EU and the US sugar imports from...

The number of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements has surged in recent years. In order to benefit from preferential tariff rates,firms must apply and comply with rules of origin requirements. This is costly and explains why preference utilization rates (PUR) are far below 100 percent. In...

We propose a general model of monopolistic competition, which encompasses existing models while being flexible enough to take into account new demand and competition features. Using the concept of Frechet differentiability, we determine a general demand system. The basic tool we use to study the...

A manufacturer chooses the optimal retail market structure and bilaterally and secretly contracts with each (homogeneous) retailer. In a classic framework without asymmetric information, the manufacturer sells through a single exclusive retailer in order to eliminate the opportunism problem....