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Relative performance evaluation, sabotage and collusion
Bloomfield, Matthew J.; Marvão, Catarina; Spagnolo, … - In: Journal of accounting & economics 76 (2023) 2/3, pp. 1-27
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014489132
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How do sanctions work? : the choice between cartel formation and tacit collusion
Andres, Maximilian; Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Friedrichsen, Jana - 2021
This paper analyzes the inner workings of cartels. To understand how sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation … suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013332300
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Inefficiency and regulation in credence goods markets with altruistic experts
Farukh, Razi; Kerkhof, Anna; Loebbing, Jonas - 2020
, price regulation should be accompanied by licensing arrangements that cap the number of experts in the market. Our theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431181
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Anchoring, reference prices, and list price collusion
Paha, Johannes - 2019
The firms in this model set non-binding list prices before competing for buyers by non-cooperatively granting discounts. Each firm has an incentive to set a high list price if, for example, the customers anchor their willingness-to-pay on the list price. However, list price competition occurs if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012314193
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Optimal destabilization of cartels
Auer, Ludwig von; Tu Anh Pham - 2020
cartel, a group of competing fringe firms, and a welfare maximizing antitrust authority. In existing models of cartel … actors. The cartel is the Stackelberg quantity leader and the fringe firms are in Cournot competition with respect to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012425162
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Manufacturer cartels and resale price maintenance
Hunold, Matthias; Muthers, Johannes - 2020
We provide a theory of how RPM facilitate upstream cartels absent any information asymmetries using a model with … manufacturers if they collude. We thus provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance when manufacturers collude and … illustrate the fit of this theory in various competition policy cases. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012438202
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Contract design with socially-attentive preferences
Koch, Simon; Sarbu, Miruna; Weinschenk, Philipp - 2019
The standard agency model assumes that the agent does not care how his decisions influence others. This is a strong assumption, which we relax. We find that, although monetary incentives are effective also with sociallyattentive agents, the principal may optimally set none. This could explain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012268393
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Bounded rationality as an essential component of the holdup problem
Erlei, Mathias; Roß, Wiebke - 2015 - Version: October 2014
We provide experimental evidence for the hypothesis that bounded rationality is an important element of the theory of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473824
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Why echo chambers are useful
Jann, Ole; Schottmuller, Christoph - 2019
Why do people appear to forgo information by sorting into “echo chambers”? We construct a highly tractable multi-sender, multi-receiver cheap talk game in which players choose with whom to communicate. We show that segregation into small, homogeneous groups can improve everybody’s...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012265620
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Accept or reject? : an organizational perspective
Garfagnini, Umberto; Ottaviani, Marco; Sørensen, Peter … - In: International journal of industrial organization 34 (2014), pp. 66-74
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011292595