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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001391948
This paper analyzes a two-player all-pay auction with incomplete information. More precisely, one bidder is uncertain about the size of the initial advantage of his rival modeled as a head start in the auction. I derive the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcome for a large class of cumulative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010339410
Incentives often distort behavior: they induce agents to exert effort but this effort is not employed optimally. This … paper proposes a theory of incentive design allowing for such distorted behavior. At the heart of the theory is a trade …-off between getting the agent to exert effort and ensuring that this effort is used well. The theory covers various moral …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344596
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003503775
This paper introduces a class of contest models in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian motion with drift and incurs costs depending on his stopping time. The player who stops his process at the highest value wins a prize. We prove existence and uniqueness of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487682
Based on the acquiring-a-company game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487717
Transparency and accountability are often regarded as crucial for good governance and the efficient organization of public affairs. To systematically explore the impact of transparency and accountability on cooperation, we conduct a series of laboratory experiments on a variation of the public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487735
We study the economic consequences of opportunities for dishonesty in an environment where efficiency relevant behaviour is not contractible, but rather incentivized by informal agreements in an ongoing relationship. We document the repeated interaction between a principal and an agent who,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483887
In a principal-agent setup, we investigate agents disclosure of conflict of interests revealing deliberate or undeliberate kindness and its affect on principals reciprocal behavior. To this end, we firstly introduce a theoretical model refering to Hart and Moore (2008) which captures aspects of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010484364
The possibility of adverse selection by training firms is common theoretical argument for company-sponsored investments in general skills. The paper derives a public and a private signal after apprenticeship training and shows that training firms are able to positively select graduates they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487686