We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long-term contract that has to be renegotiated after the realization of the state of the world, they take the initial contract as a reference point to which they compare gains and...

We consider a simple trading relationship between an expectation-based loss-averse buyer and profit-maximizing sellers. When writing a long-term contract the parties have to rely on renegotiations in order to ensure materially efficient trade ex post. The type of the concluded long-term contract...

We propose a theory of inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long-term contract that has to be renegoti- ated after the realization of the state of the world, they take the initial contract as a reference point to which they compare gains and losses...

We implement a laboratory experiment in which a principal has to decide on monitoring intensity and pay to investigate whether they are complements or substitutes. Wage level, monitoring intensity, and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization...

Inhalt: Hoyningen-Huene, Dietmar von: Grußwort. - Erhardt, Manfred: Fachhochschule im Wettbewerb. - Landfried, Klaus: Die Internationalität der Fachhochschulen. - Swatek, Dieter: Sicherung des technischen Nachwuchses in Zeiten knapper Kassen. - Kellinghusen, Georg: Anforderungen der privaten...