We derive a simple equation for the welfare gains from trade when tariffs are liberalized or iceberg trade costs fall. Covering various one-sector trade models that may or may not feature extensive margins and imperfect competition, we generalize the analysis of Arkolakis, Costinot and...

Goods trade and international mobility of labor are typically analyzed separately. While there is excellent research in both fields, far less is known about the interrelationships between international migration and international trade. This paper provides a first structurally estimable model of...

This paper endogenizes the spatial distribution of infrastructure investment and transportation costs. Transportation costs between two addresses depend on cumulative infrastructure investment. In a continuous space setting with several independent countries or regions, consumers demand domestic...

In eBay s Buy-it-Now auctions sellers can post prices at which buyers can purchase a good prior to an auction. We study how sellers set Buy-it-Now prices when buyers have independent private values for a single object for sale. We test the predictions of a model by combining the real auction...

I study the interaction between optimal procurement and outsourcing of production in small industries. First, two sellers decide about outsourcing. By outsourcing, a seller loses information about the costs of producing to his supplier. Then the buyer designs the procurement mechanism and...

This paper analyzes volatility spillovers in multivariate GARCH-type models. We show that the cross-effects between the conditional variances determine the persistence of the transmitted volatility innovations. In particular, the influence of a foreign volatility innovation on a conditional...

In a fair division game an indivisible object with an unknown common value is owned by a group of individuals and should be allocated to one of them while the others are compensated monetarily. Implementing fair division games in the lab, we find many occurrences of the winner's curse under the...

The Winner s Curse (WC) is a non-equilibrium behavior in common-value auctions involving systematic and persistent overbidding that often results in significant losses. It is one of the most robust findings in laboratory experiments. We developed an auction mechanism with a payment rule that...

We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. EU accession by Austria provides a natural experiment causing an exogenous increase in the number of bidders in Treasury Auctions. Difference-in-difference estimates suggest that the increased number in bidders...