Showing 1 - 10 of 211
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340013
This paper analyzes innovation races in a moral hazard setting. I develop a model where two competing entrepreneurs, financed by a single venture capitalist, work independently on the same project. The venture capitalist cannot observe the allocation of funds she provides, which creates a moral...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010481326
In a globalized economy, firms move production to other countries without turning a hair. A local policy maker who seeks to avert relocation faces a dynamic problem - incentivizing the firm to remain in its home country today does not guarantee that the firm also stays in the future. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010482509
On 16th November 2009, SUERF, CEPS and the Belgian Financial Forum coorganized a conference "Crisis management at cross-roads" in Brussels. All papers in the present volume are based on contributions at the conference and the SUERF Annual Lecture which followed the event.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011706117
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003481169
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003511134
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003926074
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010374720
/or risk taking and that this leads to higher expected losses for its depositors. To reduce the adverse effects of moral hazard …, policy measures have to be taken. However, a simple leverage ratio is likely to increase expected losses further and risk … adjusted capital requirements do not necessarily affect highly leveraged banks with very low risk assets. A combination of both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338928
We study an infinitely repeated principal-agent relationship with on-the-job search. On-the-job search is modeled as a dimension of the agent's effort vector that has no effect on output, but raises his future outside option. The agent's incentives to search are increasing in the degree to which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338954