Economists usually think that rational voters have little incentives to acquire costly information. We present a theoretical model to show that, in contrast to this widely held belief, rational voters acquire considerable amounts of information if media technology is available because then they...

We demonstrate how endogenous information acquisition in venture capital markets creates investment cycles when competing financiers undertake their screening decisions in an uncoordinated way, thereby highlighting the role of intertemporal screening externalities induced by competition among...

We study strategic communication between a Sender and Receiver who are both uncertain about their preferred actions. The Sender observes noisy signals about both players' ideal policies and then communicates with the Receiver. Even though Sender and Receiver disagree about ideal policies as a...

Economic policy for the information economy: a summary of the Bank's 2001 economic symposium / Craig S. Hakkio -- Opening remarks / Alan Greenspan -- The "new economy": background, historical perspective, questions, and speculations / J. Bradford DeLong and Lawrence H. Summers. Commentary /...