We study how natural-resource rents affect the risk of internal conflict within countries and how the federal structure of countries influences this relationship. Natural-resource abundance may induce excessive rent-seeking and thus increase the risk of internal conflict. Fiscal and political...

In this article we study the relation between the quality of contract enforcement and R&D investment across countries and industries. If companies invest successfully in R&D they are open for exploitation by their supplier if supply contracts are not enforceable. This hold-up problem can reduce...

In four studies (S1-S4; N = 320) we investigated whether moral hypocrisy (MH) is motivated by conscious impression management concerns or whether it is self-deceptive. In a dictator game, MH occurred both within participants (saying one thing, doing another; S1) and between participants (doing...

Das 1. Symposium für Ökonomie im Gartenbau fand am 27. November 2013 in der Paulinerkirche in Göttingen statt. Es wurde als Kooperation der Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, des Thünen- Instituts für Betriebswirtschaft und des Agrarkompetenznetzes WeGa durchgeführt. Die Veranstaltung...

We use Spanish firm-level data to test the hold-up model of global sourcing proposed by Antr s & Helpman (2004). We propose a novel representation of the model which guides us in bringing the theory to the data. We estimate a discrete choice model of firms' sourcing behavior, separately for the...

We set up a two-country general equilibrium model, in which heterogeneous firms from one country (the source country) can offshore routine tasks to a low-wage host country. The most productive firms self-select into offshoring, and the impact on welfare in the source country can be positive or...

We investigate how the lending activities of a multinational bank s affiliates located abroad are affected by funding difficulties in view of the financial crisis. For this, we consider transaction-induced changes in long-term lending to the private sector of 40 countries by the affiliates of...

Can multinational firms exert more power than national firms by influencing politics through lobbying? To answer this question, we analyze the extent of national environmental regulation when policy is determined in a lobbying game between a government and firm. We compare the resulting...

We use a representative sample of German establishments to show that those with foreign ownership are more likely to use performance appraisal, profit sharing and employee share ownership than are those with domestic ownership. Moreover, we show that works councils are associated with an...

We incorporate trade in tasks l a Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) into the international trade theory of fi rm organization of Marin and Verdier (2012) to examine how off shoring affects the way firms organize. We test the predictions of the model based on firm level data of 660 Austrian and...