We study optimal capital taxation in a dynamic Mirrleesian model with time-nonseparable preferences. The model covers the widely used cases of habit formation and durable consumption. Time-nonseparable preferences change labor supply incentives across time and thereby generate novel motives to...

We show that more human capital improves incentives in a standard optimal taxation problem: common assumptions about preferences and technology imply that the disutility of labor decreases less strongly in unobserved ability if agents have more human capital. Human capital thus reduces the...

Several frictions restrict the government s ability to tax assets. First of all, it is very costly to monitor trades on international asset markets. Moreover, agents can resort to non-observable low-return assets such as cash, gold or foreign currencies if taxes on observable assets become too...

We quantitatively characterize optimal carbon, capital, and labor income taxes in an economy-climate integrated assessment model that features overlapping generations and distortionary fiscal policy. First, we show that the optimal carbon tax significantly differs from the Pigouvian carbon levy...

This study empirically investigates the direct incidence of the corporate income tax through wage bargaining, using an industry-region level panel data set on all corporations in Germany over the period 1998 to 2006. Our measure of direct incidence for the first time accounts for employment...