Showing 1 - 10 of 523
tax (CIT) in a principal-agent model and explore how these tax instruments affect managerial incentives and how they … CIT neither has an effect on incentives nor on the incentive contract. Furthermore welfare can be increased by paying a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344626
generates incentives for herding and collective moral hazard. If banks can anticipate bailouts, they can coordinate on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010489295
non-financial incentives and test their effect on effort and performance of students. Our identification strategy exploits … cross-cohort experimental variation in assessment rules and within course variation in incentives to determine their impact … on the performance in exams. We find these incentives to result in an increase in grades of 2.4 marks or about 4%. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010341634
Incentives often distort behavior: they induce agents to exert effort but this effort is not employed optimally. This …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344596
This study uses rich information on performance outcomes to estimate the effect of bonus pay on worker productivity. We use a policy discontinuity in the call centre of a multi-national telephone company in which management introduced monetary bonuses upon achieving pre-defined performance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010489250
outset objective performance measures of pro fits in each branch were only available on the branch level and managers … allocated bonuses to their employees based on subjective assessments. In a subset of the branches, managers then obtained access …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338944
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009523008
Managers often use tournament incentive schemes which motivate workers to compete for the top, compete to avoid the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340563
We implement a laboratory experiment in which a principal has to decide on monitoring intensity and pay to investigate whether they are complements or substitutes. Wage level, monitoring intensity, and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010489889