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Fiscal treatment of managerial compensation : a welfare analysis ; conference paper
Hilmer, Michael - 2013
CIT neither has an effect on incentives nor on the incentive contract. Furthermore welfare can be increased by paying a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344626
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Wage bargaining when workers have fairness concerns : conference paper
Gogova, Martina Nikolaeva; Kragl, Jenny - 2013
contractible. If the firm can make a take-it-or leave-it offer, the optimal contract is also state-dependent but always suboptimal … leading to agency costs due inequity aversion. If the parties bargain over the optimal contract, the optimal division of … surplus is more equitable compared to the case with a purely selfish worker. Moreover, the optimal contract with bargaining …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010341624
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Monitoring and pay : an experiment on contract design with endogenous monitoring ; conference paper
Dittrich, Dennis; Kocher, Martin - 2014 - Preprint submitted to Draft
We implement a laboratory experiment in which a principal has to decide on monitoring intensity and pay to investigate whether they are complements or substitutes. Wage level, monitoring intensity, and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010489889
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The impact of incomplete contracts on economics
Aghion, Philippe (ed.); Dewatripont, Mathias (ed.);  … - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011485037
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Honesty and relational contracts : conference paper
Holger, Herz; Schmutzler, Armin; André, Volk - 2014
We study the economic consequences of opportunities for dishonesty in an environment where efficiency relevant behaviour is not contractible, but rather incentivized by informal agreements in an ongoing relationship. We document the repeated interaction between a principal and an agent who,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483887
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Multitasking and the benefits of objective performance measurement : evidence from a field experiment ; conference paper
Manthei, Kathrin; Sliwka, Dirk - 2013 - Preliminary version
outset objective performance measures of pro fits in each branch were only available on the branch level and managers … allocated bonuses to their employees based on subjective assessments. In a subset of the branches, managers then obtained access …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338944
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Flexibilisierungstendenzen in der betrieblichen Personalpolitik : Anreize, Arbeitszeiten und Qualifikation ; Beiträge zum 3. Köln-Bonner Kolloquium zur Personalökonomie
Backes-Gellner, Uschi (ed.); Kräkel, Matthias (contributor) - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001490350
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Incentive design and mis-allocated effort : conference paper
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2013 - Preliminary version
Incentives often distort behavior: they induce agents to exert effort but this effort is not employed optimally. This paper proposes a theory of incentive design allowing for such distorted behavior. At the heart of the theory is a trade-off between getting the agent to exert effort and ensuring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344596
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Firms, markets and contracts : contributions to neoinstitutional economics
Picot, Arnold (ed.); Schlicht, Ekkehart (contributor) - 1996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014007620