A successful transformation to a carbon neutral energy system requires the correct investments in transmission and production capacity. In a zonal pricing electricity market, the one proposed by the European Commission to integrate the European electricity markets, I analyze the effects that...

In centralized markets, producers submit detailed cost data to the day-ahead market, and the market operator decides how much should be produced in each plant. This differs from decentralized markets that rely on self-commitment and where producers send less detailed cost information to the...

This paper develops a simple nonparametric test for perfect competition in markets for homogenous goods. The method only requires data on prices and some aggregate of output. We then generalize the method to account for variable capacity and intertemporal production decisions. We apply the...

The literature on deregulated electricity markets generally assumes available capacities to be given. In contrast, this paper studies a model where firms precommit to capacity levels before competing in a uniform price auction. The analysis sheds light on recent empirical findings that firms use...

The supply function equilibrium provides a game-theoretic model of strategic bidding in oligopolistic wholesale electricity auctions. This paper presents an intuitive account of current understanding and shows how welfare losses depend on the number of firms in the market and their asymmetry....

We demonstrate how suppliers can take strategic speculative positions in derivatives markets to soften competition in the spot market. In our game, suppliers first choose a portfolio of call options and then compete with supply functions. In equilibrium firms sell forward contracts and buy call...

This paper characterizes the Nash equilibrium in a pay-as-bid (discriminatory), divisible-good, procurement auction. Demand by the auctioneer is uncertain as in the supply function equilibrium model. A closed form expression is derived. Existence of an equilibrium is ensured if the hazard rate...

In most wholesale electricity markets generators must submit step-function offers of supply to a uniform price auction, and the market is cleared at the price of the most expensive offer needed to meet realised demand. Such markets can most elegantly be modelled as the pure-strategy, Nash...

Forward sales is a credible commitment to aggressive spot market bidding, and it mitigates producers’ market power in electricity markets. Still it can be profitable for a producer to make such a commitment if it results in a soft response from competitors in the spot market (strategies are...

Capacity constraints on transmissions of electricity are raising an increasing policy concern as electricity markets are integrated around the world. But our understanding of the workings of such markets is still limited. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the impact of transmission...