Showing 1 - 10 of 65,585
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418245
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011438022
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449662
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011414725
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855287
of male job seekers in West Germany in the year 2000, we analyze the effects of vacancy referrals and sanctions on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011635521
In Hungary, employees could claim sickness insurance benefit within 3 days of job-loss, which would enable them to extend their benefit duration by up to 90 days. The maximum number of days of this 'passive sickness benefit' was halved in 2007. We first investigate whether claiming passive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014454732
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009158468
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000680520
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008656386