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Choosing whether to compete : price and format competition with consumer confusion
Crosetto, Paolo; Gaudeul, Alexia - 2014
We run a market experiment where firms can choose not only their price but also whether to present comparable offers. They are faced with artificial demand from consumers who make mistakes when assessing the net value of products on the market. If some offers are comparable however, some...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010433911
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Price matching in online retail
Bottasso, Anna; Robbiano, Simone; Marocco, Paolo - 2023
We analyze a sample of consumer-electronics products sold by the US NewEgg online-retailer to study the impact of Price Matching Guarantees (PMGs) policies on prices. By applying aDifference-in-Differences approach,we find that prices of the policy-adopting retailer increase by 4.7% during the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014435142
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Oligopoly as a socially embedded dilemma : an experiment
Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2011
is highest if only the competitor(s) is (are) loyal to the cartel. Yet collusion inflicts harm on the opposite market … we add beliefs as a control variable, we only find that externalities enhance cooperation, even if gains from collusion … expected. -- Oligopoly ; Collusion ; experiment ; Uncertainty ; negative externalities ; prisoner's dilemma …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822475
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Actions Speak Louder than Words : econometric evidence to target tacit collusion in oligopolistic markets
Andreoli Versbach, Patrick; Franck, Jens-Uwe - 2013
Tacit collusion reduces welfare comparably to explicit collusion but remains mostly unaddressed by antitrust … that facilitate tacit collusion by providing quantitative evidence that links these actions to an anticompetitive market … about collusion. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009777055
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Injunctions against false advertising
Baumann, Florian; Rasch, Alexander - 2019
Rules of consumer protection or fair competition can be publicly or privately enforced. We consider the possibility of false advertising by a firm in duopolistic competition where consumers can be distinguished according to whether or not they form rational beliefs about the trustworthiness of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012012317
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Injunctions against false advertising
Baumann, Florian; Rasch, Alexander - 2019
Rules of consumer protection or fair competition can be publicly or privately enforced. We consider the possibility of false advertising by a firm in duopolistic competition where consumers can be distinguished according to whether or not they form rational beliefs about the trustworthiness of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012197740
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Collusion and durability
Strausz, Roland; Sasaki, Dan - 2008
-monotonic in the number of firms; 4) a regulator may demand inefficiently high levels of durability to prevent collusion. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343926
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Honest certification and the threat of capture
Strausz, Roland - 2004
This paper derives conditions under which reputation enables certifiers to resist capture. These conditions alone have strong implications for the industrial organization of certification markets: 1) Honest certification requires high prices that may even exceed the static monopoly price. 2)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343969
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The fight against cartels : a transatlantic perspective
Dargaud, Emilie; Mantovani, Andrea; Carlo, Reggiani - 2013
The fight against cartels is a priority for antitrust authorities on both sides of the Atlantic. What differs between the EU and the US is not the basic toolkit for achieving deterrence, but to whom it is targeted. In the EU, pecuniary sanctions against the firm are the only instruments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011730980
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Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
Cerrone, Claudia; Hermstrüwer, Yoan; Robalo, Pedro - 2018
This paper explores the impact of debarment as a deterrent of collusion in first-price procurement auctions. We develop … both reduce collusion and bids. The deterrent effect of debarment increases in its length. However, the debarment of … reduction resulting from debarment may trigger tacit collusion. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011822812