Static and dynamic games are important tools for the analysis of strategic interactions among economic agents and have found many applications in economics. In many games equilibria can be described as solutions of polynomial equations. In this paper we describe state-of-the-art techniques for...

We consider discrete time dynamic principal--agent problems with continuous choice sets and potentially multiple agents. We prove the existence of a unique solution for the principal's value function only assuming continuity of the functions and compactness of the choice sets. We do this by a...

In this paper we present some new results for the dynamic agent model by Iossa and Rey (2014, "Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration,'' Journal of the European Economic Association, 12, 549−574) while also correcting some errors...

This paper presents a new method for the analysis of moral hazard principal-agent problems. The new approach avoids the stringent assumptions on the distribution of outcomes made by the classical first-order approach and instead only requires the agent's expected utility to be a rational...

In many studies involving complex representation of the Earth's climate, the number of runs for the particular model is highly restricted and the designed set of input scenarios has to be reduced correspondingly. Furthermore, many integrated assessment models, in particular those focusing on...

Many bond portfolio managers argue that bond laddering tends to outperform other bond investment strategies because it reduces both market price risk and reinvestment risk for a bond portfolio in the presence of interest rate uncertainty. Despite the popularity of bond ladders as a strategy for...