Similar Search Results

School choice with consent : an experiment

Cerrone, Claudia; Hermstrüwer, Yoan; Kesten, Onur - 2022

manipulation. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012815570

The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice

Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kesten, Onur - 2014

attracted much attention both in theory and practice due to its superior efficiency and incentive features. We discuss and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429798

Playing the system : address manipulation and access to schools

Bjerre-Nielsen, Andreas; Christensen, Lykke Sterll; … - 2023

deadline, suggesting that the observed increase in address changes mainly reflects manipulation. The manipulation is driven by … absence of address manipulation and their peer GPA is 0.2SD lower due to the manipulative behavior of other applicants. Our …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014286645

Improving transparency and verifiability in school admissions : theory and experiment

Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Raghavan, Madhav - 2023

Students participating in centralized admissions procedures do not typically have access to the information used to determine their matched school, such as other students' preferences or school priorities. This can lead to doubts about whether their matched schools were computed correctly (the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014477372

On the (im)possibility of improving upon the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism

Kesten, Onur; Kurino, Morimitsu - 2012

-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) has played a central role not only in theory but also in important practical applications …-proposing deferred acceptance"-Mechanismus (DA) spielt eine zentrale Rolle nicht nur in der Theorie sondern auch in wichtigen praktischen …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009566572

What happens when separate and unequal school districts merge?

Aue, Robert; Klein, Thilo; Ortega, Josue - 2020

students' welfare, even if the student-optimal stable matching is consistently chosen. However, on average all students …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012241889

Decentralizing centralized matching markets : implications from early offers in university admissions

Grenet, Julien; He, Yinghua; Kübler, Dorothea - 2019

The matching literature commonly rules out that market design itself shapes agent preferences. Underlying this premise … matching process. Under this assumption, a centralized matching market can often outperform a decentralized one. Using a quasi …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012014369

Decentralizing centralized matching markets : implications from early offers in university admissions

Grenet, Julien; He, Yinghua; Kübler, Dorothea - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012033869

Transparency and fairness in school choice mechanisms

Hermstrüwer, Yoan - 2019

assumptions in matching theory, I show that the Boston mechanism improves perceived fairness. These results underscore the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012041733

Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice

Jaramillo, Paula - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477295