We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is …

Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining … over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees …

We consider non-cooperative bargaining on the division of a surplus under simple majority rule. We use the "open rule …" bargaining protocol as originally suggested by Baron and Ferejohn (1989): Proposals can be amended before they are voted on. It … is widely known that there are significant gaps in our understanding of open rule bargaining. In order to address these …

We study dynamic committee bargaining over an infinite horizon with discounting. In each period a committee proposal is … the Markov equilibrium. We find significant evidence of concave utility functions. -- Dynamic bargaining ; voting …

We present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizion. In each … dictatorship (q=1). -- Dynamic political economy ; voting ; public goods ; bargaining ; experiments …

We conduct experiments to investigate the effects of different majority requirements on bargaining outcomes in small … (number of bargaining rounds needed to reach agreement) and measures of "fairness" (inclusiveness of coalitions, equality of …

We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of …

We present a model of bargaining in which a committee searches over the policy space, successively amending the default … by voting over proposals. Bargaining ends when proposers are unable or unwilling to amend the existing default, which is … in semi-Markovian equilibria form the largest consistent set. -- bargaining ; evolving default ; stable set …