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Does expressing disapproval influence future cooperation? : an experimental study
Koukoumelis, Anastasios; Levati, M. Vittoria - 2014
We report on an experiment designed to explore whether a written expression of disapproval affects future levels of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010405218
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Incorporating fairness motives into the impulse balance equilibrium and quantal response equilibrium concepts : an application to 2x2 games
Tavoni, Alessandro - 2009
Substantial evidence has accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Nash equilibrium to rationalize observed behavior in many classes of games played by experimental subjects. This realization has led to several attempts aimed at finding tractable equilibrium concepts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008811006
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Whom are you talking with? : an experiment on credibility and communication structure
Grandjean, Gilles; Mantovani, Marco; Mauleon, Ana; … - 2014
messages, on their credibility and on actual play. We run an experiment in a three-player coordination game with Pareto ranked …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010418867
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The trust game behind the veil of ignorance : a note on gender differences
Výrašteková, Jana; Onderstal, Sander - 2010
We analyze gender differences in the trust game in a behind the veil of ignorance design. This method yields strategies that are consistent with actions observed in the classical trust game experiments. We observe that, on average, men and women do not differ in trust, and that women are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380925
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Majoritarian contests with asymmetric battlefields : an experiment
Montero, María; Possajennikov, Alexandre; Sefton, Martin; … - 2013
choices from a laboratory experiment. The equilibrium predicts that the large battlefield receives more than a proportional …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224988
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Giving and costless retaliation in the power-to-take game
Drouvelis, Michalis; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Shimada, Natsumi; … - 2023
Extending the power-to-take game, we explore the impact of two forces that may shape retaliation. In our 2x2 design, i) in addition to taking, the proposers can give part of their endowment to the responders, and ii) in addition to destroying their own endowment in retaliation, the responders...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014331767
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The values of ex-ante and ex-post communication in dictator games
Langenbach, Pascal - 2014
two experimentswhich study how the timing of messages affects dictators' decisions (experiment 1) and which value … recipients attach to communication opportunities (experiment 2). The first experiment shows that the effect of communication on …, recipients in a second experiment reveal a strong preference for pre-decision messages: Their willingnessto pay for pre …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361495
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Letting off steam! : experimental evidence on inappropriate punishment
Khachatryan, Elina; Bühren, Christoph - 2020
Aggression is displaced when provocations cannot be directly retaliated against and when it is redirected towards a target innocent of any wrongdoing. While this phenomenon is widespread, it has not been widely explored in experimental economics. We fill this gap and find that a sizeable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012542938
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The values of ex-ante and ex-post communication in dictator games
Langenbach, Pascal - 2016 - Revised version: April 2016
two experimentswhich study how the timing of messages affects dictators' decisions (experiment 1) and which value … recipients attach to communication opportunities (experiment 2). The first experiment shows that the effect of communication on …, recipients in a second experiment reveal a strong preference for pre-decision messages: Their willingnessto pay for pre …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671666
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Teams promise but do not deliver
Nielsen, Kirby; Bhattacharya, Puja; Kagel, John H.; … - 2019
Individuals and two-person teams play a hidden - action trust game with pre - play communication. We replicate previous results for individuals that non-binding promises increase cooperation rates. But this does not extend to teams. Wh ile teams make non-binding promises to cooperate at the same...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012014362