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equilibrium exists independently of the number of players, and the delay in this equilibrium is increasing in the number of … sufficiently large. The expected inefficiency due to delay at the least and at the most efficient equilibrium increases as the … number of players increases. Under any (super)majority rule, however, there is no equilibrium with delay or inefficiency. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012176463
This paper presents an analysis of general time preferences in the canonical Rubinstein (1982) model of bargaining, allowing for arbitrarily history-dependent strategies. I derive a simple sufficient structure for optimal punishments and thereby fully characterize (i) the set of equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705183
On the basis of literature on delay discounting, potential mechanisms of relations between self-control and altruism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011801766
Numerous studies have investigated how people resolve intertemporal trade-offs in individual decision making, but little is known about how the timing of costs and benefits affects behavior in strategic decision situations. Here, we experimentally study how delayed costs and/or benefits affect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011906687
considersthe case of arbitrary nondecreasing reward and penalty functions on the total expedition and delay, respectively …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379216
We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. Within this setup, we ask whether policymakers should interfere when better informed agents make individual investment decisions. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008699644
We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. When the public information is sufficiently high and a social planer therefore expects an investment boom, investments should be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935694