This paper examines the linking of price-based and quantity-based provision of a public good by two parties in the example of pollution control under a global quantity constraint, using a stochastic partial-equilibrium model. One country chooses a price-based instrument (tax) and trades with...

This paper examines the effects of combining an international cap-and-trade scheme with national carbon taxes. We consider a two-country stochastic partial equilibrium model with log-normally distributed uncertainty. The situation is analogous to the situation where European countries impose...

This paper reviews the literature on distributional effects of energy and carbon taxation with focus on microsimulation models. Most studies find that direct energy and carbon taxation tends to be regressive. Regressive effects occur mostly with respect to taxation of electricity or space...

This paper reviews the literature on distributional effects of energy and carbon taxation with focus on microsimulation models. Most studies find that direct energy and carbon taxation tends to be regressive. Regressive effects occur mostly with respect to taxation of electricity or space...

This paper deals with designing emissions trading in practice. After a short introduction to the general idea of emissions trading, practical requirements for the introduction of an emissions trading scheme are considered, including the temporal and spatial dimension as well as administrative...

This paper empirically investigates the impact of transaction costs for monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) of emissions on companies regulated by the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) in Germany. Based on a unique panel dataset, we investigate if MRV costs are dependent on the...

In this paper, transaction costs in the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) are examined empirically based on survey data from German companies. Transaction costs from measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) of emissions, permit trading and general informational costs are considered....

As shown by R. Hahn [6], free allocation equal to the amount of permits a firm with market power uses in equilibrium, can prevent welfare losses. If the necessary amount of free allocation is not provided to the firm with market power, a second best solution is obtained where marginal abatement...