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Cseh, Ágnes; Fleiner, Tamás; Harján, Petra - 2020

value of a coalition-based on the best or worst roommate in the coalition. In all cases, we determine the complexity of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012211586

Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions : (extended version)

Solymosi, Tamás - 2019 - (extended version)

We study linearly weighted versions of the least core and the (pre)nucleolus and investigatethe reduction possibilities in their computation. We slightly extend some well-known related results and establish their counterparts by using the dual game. Our main results imply, for example, that if...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012016477

Strategic delegation in the formation of modest international environmental agreements

Spycher, Sarah; Winkler, Ralph - 2021 - This version: December 2020

policy. To this end, we expand the modest coalition formation game, in which countries first decide on whether to join an … and emissions. We find that strategic delegation crowds out all efforts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013326522

Coalition formation in general apex games under monotonic power indices

Karos, Dominik - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010257855

Focused power : experiments, the Shapley-Shubik power index, and focal points

Geller, Chris R.; Mustard, Jamie; Shahwan, Ranya - 2013

Experiments evaluate the fit of human behaviour to the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI), a formula of voter power. Groups of six subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms. Earnings proxy for measured power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009789971

Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions

Kóczy, László Á. - 2014

Power indices have been used to evaluate the allocation of power in a wide range of voting situations. While they use the language of game theory known measures of a priori voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. We introduce a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429130

Proportional payoffs in majority games

Montero, María (contributor) - 2008

modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second …, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most … propoper advantage and a linear relationship between weights and ex post payoffs for all coalition members other than the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003675312

Voting rules in multilateral bargaining: using an experiment to relax procedural assumptions

Tremewan, James; Vanberg, Christoph - 2018

of a minimum winning coalition, and unanimity rule is associated with greater delay. However, the earlier finding of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011889435

The third vote experiment : VAA-based election to enhance policy representation of the KIT student parliament

Tanguiane, Andranick S. - 2016

Since voters are often swayed more by the personal image of politicians than by party manifestos, they may cast votes that are in opposition to their policy preferences. This results in the election of representatives who do not correspond exactly to the voters' own views. An alternative voting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011531378

The Coleman-Shapley-index : being decisive within the coalition of the interested

Casajus, André; Hüttner, Frank - 2018

The Coleman Power of the Collectivity to Act (CPCA) is a popular statistic that reflects the ability of a committee to pass a proposal. Applying the Shapley value to this measure, we derive a new power index that indicates each voter's contribution to the CPCA. This index is characterized by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011844627