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discrete bonuses after they do sufficiently well. By adjusting monitoring intensity and communication of performance, the …
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Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? Suppose the principal's evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. If she does not provide justification, her message space is restricted, but the message is costless. I...
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This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interests on strategic communication when the sender has lying …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420613
of projects. The agent is biased in favor of implementation and no credible communication is possible in a one …-shot setting. In a repeated setting, the fear of losing future influence can sustain informative communication, but the agent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011800617
Consider managers evaluating their employees' performances. Should managers justify their subjective evaluations? Suppose a manager's evaluation is private information. Justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal's scope for distorting her evaluation of the employee. I show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011930440
This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interests on strategic communication when the sender has lying …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011490047
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