Existing cooperative game theoretic studies of bargaining power in gas pipeline systems are based on the so called characteristic function form (CFF). This approach is potentially misleading if some pipelines fall under regulated third party access (TPA). TPA, which is by now the norm in the EU,...

We show the existence of an upper bound for the number of blocks required to get from one imputation to another provided that accessibility holds. The bound depends only on the number of players in the TU game considered. For the class of games with non-empty cores this means that the core can...

The nucleolus offers a desirable payoff-sharing solution in cooperative games, thanks to its attractive properties. Although computing the nucleolus is very challenging, the Kohlberg criterion offers a method for verifying whether a solution is the nucleolus in relatively small games (number of...

We consider upper and lower bounds for maxmin allocations of a completely divisible good in both competitive and cooperative strategic contexts. We then derive a subgradient algorithm to compute the exact value up to any fixed degree of precision. -- Fair Division ; Maxmin Allocation ; Kalai...

A matching game is a cooperative game (N; v) defined on a graph G = (N;E) with an edge weighting w : E → R+. The player set is N and the value of a coalition S C̱ N is defined as the maximum weight of a matching in the subgraph induced by S. First we present an O (nm+n2 log n) algorithm that...

The aim of this paper is to propose a new solution for the roommate problem with strict references. We introduce the solution of maximum irreversibility and consider almost stable matchings (Abraham et al. [2]) and maximum stable matchings (Tan [30] [32]). We find that almost stable matchings...

The stable roommates problem with payments has as input a graph G(E,V) with an edge weighting w:E→R+ and the problem is to find a stable solution. A solution is a matching M with a vector pϵRV that satisfies 􂀀pu+pv=w(uv) for all uvϵM and pu=0 for all u unmatched in M. A solution is stable...

Power indices are mappings that quantify the influence of the members of a voting body on collective decisions a priori. Their nonlinearity and discontinuity makes it difficult to compute inverse images, i.e., to determine a voting system which induces a power distribution as close as possible...

In this paper we investigate some new applications of Scarf's Lemma. First, we introduce the notion of fractional core for NTU-games, which is always nonempty by the Lemma. Stable allocation is a general solution concept for games where both the players and their possible cooperations can have...

We generalize two well-known game-theoretic models by introducing multiple partners matching games, defined by a graph G = (N;E), with an integer vertex capacity function b and an edge weighting w. The set N consists of a number of players that are to form a set M is a subset of E of 2-player...