This paper develops identification and estimation methods for dynamic structural models when agents' actions are unobserved by econometricians. We provide conditions under which choice probabilities and latent state transition rules are nonparametrically identified with a continuous state...

This paper develops identification and estimation methods for dynamic structural models when agents' actions are unobserved by econometricians. We provide conditions under which choice probabilities and latent state transition rules are nonparametrically identified with a continuous state...

This paper considers the estimation problem of structural models for which empirical restrictions are characterized by a fixed point constraint, such as structural dynamic discrete choice models or models of dynamic games. We analyze the conditions under which the nested pseudo-likelihood (NPL)...

This paper considers the estimation problem of structural models for which empirical restrictions are characterized by a fixed point constraint, such as structural dynamic discrete choice models or models of dynamic games. We analyze the conditions under which the nested pseudo-likelihood (NPL)...

We study the asymptotic properties of a class of estimators of the structural parameters in dynamic discrete choice games. We consider K-stage policy iteration (PI) estimators, where K denotes the number of policy iterations employed in the estimation. This class nests several estimators...

This paper analyses the problem of designing macroeconomic stabilization policies within the European Monetary Union (EMU) as a dynamic game between a centralized monetary authority, the European Central Bank (ECB), and national fiscal policy makers. Non-cooperative feedback Nash equilibrium and...

The paper studies a dynamic communication game in the presence of adverse selection and career concerns. A forecaster of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome of some future event. We find that in all equilibria in a...

This paper analyzes the problem of designing macroeconomic stabilization policies within the European Monetary Union (EMU) as a dynamic game between a centralized monetary authority, the European Central Bank (ECB), and national fiscal policy makers. Non-cooperative feedback Nash equilibrium and...