of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …

reputation for quality, and a principal (e.g. a regulator) can learn the agent's quality via costly inspections. Monitoring plays … two roles: an incentive role, because outcomes of inspections affect agent's reputation, and an informational role because …

We investigate the relationship between external quality evaluation via experts, firm reputation and product prices and … extend the existing empirical literature in three dimensions. First, we empirically account for endogenous reputation effects …. An increase in quality has an immediate positive impact on product prices but also improves the reputation of a firm …

information about the multiplier. We discuss potential reasons for the deviation between theory and experimental data. …

-lived agent builds trust over time and improves their reputation by keeping the scheme going. …

I study reputation models in which information about the long-run player's past behavior is dispersed among short …-run players. I identify two challenges to reputation building when such information is aggregated via the short-run players …-run player's current period action, I propose a resistent to learning condition under which reputation fails. This is because the …