We study the term structure of disagreement of professional forecasters for key macroeconomic variables. We document a novel set of facts: 1) forecasters disagree at all horizons, including the very long run; 2) the shape of the term structure of disagreement differs markedly across variables:...

Macroeconomic expectations of various economic agents are characterized by substantial cross-sectional heterogeneity. In this paper, we focus on expectations heterogeneity among professional forecasters. We first present stylized facts and discuss theoretical explanations for heterogeneous...

We study a communication game of common interest in which the sender observes one of infinite types and sends one of finite messages which is interpreted by the receiver. In equilibrium there is no full separation but types are clustered into convex categories. We give a full characterization of...

In standard rational choice modelling decisions are made according to given information and preferences. In the model presented here the 'information technology' of individual decision makers as well as their preferences evolve in a dynamic process. In this process decisions are made rationally...

We study cheap-talk pre-play communication in the static all-pay auctions. For the case of two bidders, all correlated and communication equilibria are payoff equivalent to the Nash equilibrium if there is no reserve price, or if it is commonly known that one bidder has a strictly higher value....

In his work on market signaling, Spence proposed a dynamic model of a signaling market in which a buyer revises prices in light of experience and sellers choose utility-maximizing signals given these prices. Spence also suggested that subjecting the dynamic process to rare perturbations might...

This paper analyses an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless signals about the cost of a new project and decide when to invest. We characterize the equilibrium of the investment timing game with private and public signals. We show that competition leads the two...

This paper challenges recent results on the fragility of the value of commitment. It introduces a specific notion of the 'value of information' for a later-moving player about the action choice of a previously-moving player, gives conditions under which this value is positive and shows that a...