We investigate whether aggressive tax planning firms have a less transparent information environment. Although tax planning provides expected tax savings, it can simultaneously increase the financial complexity of the organization. And, to the extent that this greater financial complexity cannot...

Can managers influence the liquidity of their firms' shares? We use plausibly exogenous variation in the supply of public information to show that firms actively shape their information environments by voluntarily disclosing more information than regulations mandate and that such efforts improve...

We examine the relation between the presence of U.S. government as a major customer and a supplier firm's loan contract terms, using major corporate customers as a benchmark. We find that firms with major government customers are associated with a lower number of covenants and a lower likelihood...

Although stock options are commonly observed in chief executive o±cer (CEO) compensation contracts, there is theoretical controversy about whether stock options are part of the optimal contract. Using a sample of Fortune 500 companies, we solve an agency model calibrated to the company-specific...