Showing 1 - 10 of 55
This paper provides an argument for the advantage of a preference for identity-consistent behaviour from an evolutionary point of view. Within a stylised model of social interaction, we show that the development of cooperative social norms is greatly facilitated if the agents of the society...
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We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008662594
Confirmation bias, which refers to unintentional and unknowing selectivity in the use of evidence, belongs to the major problems faced by organizations. In this article, we discuss job rotation as a natural solution to this problem. In a nutshell, adopting job rotation provides an organization...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003951018
The extant theory on price discrimination in input markets takes the structure of the intermediate industry as exogenously given. This paper endogenizes the structure of the intermediate industry and examines the effects of banning third-degree price discrimination on market structure and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003954080
We consider a monopolistic supplier's optimal choice of wholesale tariffs when downstream firms are privately informed about their retail costs. Under discriminatory pricing, downstream firms that differ in their ex ante distribution of retail costs are offered different tariffs. Under uniform...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009375743
We extend Akerlof's (1970) "Market for Lemons" by assuming that some buyers are overconfident. Buyers in our model receive a noisy signal about the quality of the good that is at display for sale. Overconfident buyers do not update according to Bayes' rule but take the noisy signal at face...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009375745
We consider a two-stage principal-agent model with limited liability in which a CEO is employed as agent to gather information about suitable merger targets and to manage the merged corporation in case of an acquisition. Our results show that the CEO systematically recommends targets with low...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430291
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis regarding strategic interaction under expectation-based loss-aversion. First, we develop a coherent framework for the analysis by extending the equilibrium concepts of Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) to strategic interaction and demonstrate how to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430524