This dissertation examines two problems that may arise in matching problems.The first two chapters deal with auctions for multiple units where bidders exhibitexternalities. The third chapter links risk aversion and information to unraveling inlabor markets.Auctions can lead to efficient...

We consider an extension of the classical secretary problem where a decision maker observes only the relative ranks of a sequence of up to N applicants, whose true values are i.i.d. U[0,1] random variables. Applicants arrive according to a homogeneous Poisson Process, and the decision maker...

Chapter 1: Efficient Design of an Auction with Discrete Bid Levels This paper studies one of auction design issues: the choice of bid levels. Full efficiency is generally unachievable with a discrete auction. Since there may be more than one bidder who submits the same bid, the auction cannot...

When selling divisible goods such as energy contracts or emission allowances, should the entire supply be auctioned all at once or should it be spread over a sequence of auctions? How does the expected revenue in a sequence of uniform price auctions compare to the expected revenue in a single...

Market design is the development of mechanisms that improve market efficiency and build on an understanding of the interaction between human behavior and market rules. The first chapter considers the sale of a charitable membership where the charity poses the market design question of how to...