This paper investigates the welfare costs of unilateral versus internationally coordinated emission permit policies in a two-country overlapping generations model with producer carbon emissions. We show that, for a net foreign debtor country, the domestic welfare costs of a unilateral domestic...

This paper addresses the issue of whether the powers of monitoring compliance and allocating tradeable emissions allowances within a federation of countries should be appointed to a unique federal regulator or decentralized to several local regulators. To this end, we develop a two stage game...

We develop a two-country (North and South), two-good, general equilibrium model of international trade in goods and explore the effects of domestic and international emission trading under free trade in goods. Whereas domestic emission trading in North may result in carbon leakage by expanding...

We present a two-good, two-country overlapping generations model where emissions arise from production and each country has a domestic emission permit system. When one country unilaterally reduces her cap on emissions, her output available for domestic and foreign consumption diminishes more...

In the absence of an international agreement on climate policy, unilateral carbon abatement creates two problems: It tends to have a detrimental effect on domestic competitiveness, and it leads to an increase in carbon emissions abroad (leakage). This paper analyses two policies that have...