Losses may accrue to depositors at insolvent banks both at and after the time of official resolution. Losses at resolution occur because of poor closure rules and regulatory forbearance. Losses after resolution occur if depositors'' access to their claims is delayed or ""frozen."" While the...

"Recent evidence suggests that bank regulators appear to be able to resolve insolvent large banks efficiently without either protecting uninsured deposits through invoking 'too-big-to-fail' or causing serious harm to other banks or financial markets. But resolving swap positions at insolvent...

"Bank failures are widely feared for a number of reasons, including concern that depositors may suffer both losses in the value of their deposits (credit losses) and, possibly more importantly, restrictions in access to their deposits (liquidity losses). In the United States, this is not true...

This paper examines the implications that alternative regulatory structures may have for resolving failed banking institutions. We place our emphasis on the European Union (EU), which is both economically and financially large and has several features relating to cross-border banking in the form...

This paper extends the literature on bank capital structure by modeling capital structure as a function of important public policy and bank regulatory characteristics of the home country, as well as of bank-specific variables, country-level macroeconomic conditions, and country-level financial...