Showing 1 - 10 of 6,879
of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123351
of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster's reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012140661
counterpart where such a scheme can never be optimal. Our model also exhibits reputation dynamics which capture a pervasive view …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623886
In simple textbook treatment of bilateral exchange traders end up on the contract curve such that the trading surplus is maximized regardless of any asymmetric bargaining power they might have. However, that need not be true when the terms of exchange are determined by uncooperative bargaining,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011882745
In simple textbook treatment of bilateral exchange traders end up on the contract curve such that the trading surplus is maximized regardless of any asymmetric bargaining power they might have. However, that need not be true when the terms of exchange are determined by uncooperative bargaining,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011435708
In a recent paper, Muthoo (1995) discusses whether the Rubinstein solution carries over on repeated bargaining situations. He concludes that stationary equilibria for such a repeated bargaining game do not imply the Rubinstein solution and that several non-stationary equilibria may exist. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275624
We consider a class of perfect information bargaining games with unanimity acceptance rule. The proposer and the order of responding players are determined by the state that evolves stochastically over time. The probability distribution of the state in the next period is determined jointly by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753260
We analyze the topical question of how the compensation of elected politicians affects the set of citizens choosing to run. To this end, we develop a sparse and tractable citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with ability differences, informative campaigning and political parties....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261945
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012265729
It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because researchers cannot randomly “assign” career prospects to economic agents. To overcome this challenge, we use data from professional soccer, where employees of the same club face...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011808006