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In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011600156
In a society composed of a ruler and its citizens: what are the determinants of the political equilibrium between these two? This paper approaches this problem as a game played between a ruler who has to decide the distribution of the aggregate income and a group of agents/citizens who have the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324912
of alliance formation in any equilibrium. In this case there exists a pooling equilibrium without alliances with a unique …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487967
Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex ante uncertain. While they eventually learn their own preferences, they have to pay a small cost if they want to learn their opponent's preferences. We show that, for sufficiently small positive costs of information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412685
This is a game-theoretic analysis of the link between regime type and international conflict. The democratic electorate can credibly punish the leader for bad conflict outcomes, whereas the autocratic selectorate cannot. For the fear of being thrown out of office, democratic leaders are (i )...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003723925
The allocation of a co-owned company to a single owner using the Texas Shoot-Out mechanism with private valuations is investigated. We identify Knightian Uncertainty about the peer's distribution as the reason for its deterrent effect of an immature dissolving. Modeling uncertainty by a compact...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013174846
This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Provided that the contest is uniformly asymmetric, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012420336
This paper studies incentives for the interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Considered are unfair contests, i.e., contests in which, subject to activity conditions, one player (the favorite) is interim always more likely to win than the other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011805749
This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014321141
We study the role of information exchange through alliances in a framework with contestants who have binding budget … for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then we consider the role of information exchange through alliances. Contestants learn … alliance. Also, a merger between alliances is beneficial for their members. Further, we consider merger between alliances and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307679