present results from a laboratory experiment in which two parties can appropriate resources via a contest or, alternatively … compares conflict choices of players in two-against-two, one-against-one, and two-against-one settings. Overall, we find … evidence for a higher propensity to opt for conflict when entering the fight in a group than when having to fight as a single …

contest. In both cases, when decisions to share information are made independently, sharing information is strictly dominated …

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium … the distribution costs are drawn from and on the exact specification of the contest success function. …

This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game … effort choice in the contest and there exist equilibria in which all types prefer to form an alliance. If the formation of an …

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium … the distribution costs are drawn from and on the exact specification of the contest success function. …

contest. In both cases, when decisions to share information are made independently, sharing information is strictly dominated …

This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game … effort choice in the contest and there exist equilibria in which all types prefer to form an alliance. If the formation of an …