This paper presents a theory of the allocation of authority in an organization in which centralization is limited by the agent's ability to disobey the principal. We show that workers are given more authority when they are costly to replace or do not mind looking for another job, even if they...

This paper studies whether green investors can influence corporate greenhouse gas emissions through capital markets, either by divesting their stock and limiting polluters' access to capital, or holding polluters' stock and engaging with management. We focus on public pension funds, classifying...

New government spending must be approved by a referendum of citizens in many Swiss cantons. This decisionmaking procedure seems like a simple way to address citizen-legislator agency problems, but little systematic evidence is available concerning its effect on spending outcomes. We estimate...

New government spending must be approved by a referendum of citizens in many Swiss cantons. This decisionmaking procedure seems like a simple way to address citizen-legislator agency problems, but little systematic evidence is abailable concerning its effect on spending outcomes. We estimate...