The paper suggests a partial solution to the disjunction between the institutional environment and the institutions of governance by considering the budget constraint. This approach is put in the perspective of the comparative analysis of economic organizations as discrete structural...

The paper suggests a partial solution to the disjunction between the institutional environment and the institutions of governance by considering the budget constraint. This approach is put in the perspective of the comparative analysis of economic organizations as discrete structural...

The European sovereign debt crisis has demonstrated the need for a rethinking of the European integration project. The strong variety between member countries prevented Eurozone to become a fiscal and political union and the asymmetric architecture of EMU revealed different weaknesses. The...

The European sovereign debt crisis has demonstrated the need for a rethinking of the European integration project. The strong variety between member countries prevented Eurozone to become a fiscal and political union and the asymmetric architecture of EMU revealed different weaknesses. The...

We study conditional cooperation based on a sequential two-person linear public good game in which a trusting first contributor can be exploited by a second contributor. After playing this game the first contributor is allowed to punish the second contributor. The consequences of sanctioning...

This paper extends choice theory by allowing for the interaction between cognitive costs and social norms. The authors experimentally investigate the role of imitation and temporal decisional patterns when participants face a task which is costly in cognitive terms. They identify two main...

We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance. We explore this through a formal leniency program. In our experiment, we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework. We not only...

We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes taxpayers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance. We explore this through a formal leniency program. In our experiment, we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework. We not only...

We investigate the effects of an institutional mechanism that incentivizes tax payers to blow the whistle on collusive corruption and tax compliance. We do this through a leniency program. In our experiment we nest collusive corruption within a tax evasion framework. We not only study the effect...