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A fair division problem with indivisible objects, e.g. jobs, and one divisible good (money) is considered. The individuals consume one object and money. The class of strategy-proof and fair allocation rules is characterized. The allocation rules in the class are like a Vickrey auction bossy and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208452
We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011297547
We consider the problem of matching a set of medical students to a set of medical residency positions (hospitals) under … preference revelation game induced by the student proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. We show that the acyclicity of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011817201
We consider the problem of matching a set of medical students to a set of medical residency positions (hospitals) under … preference revelation game induced by the student proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. We show that the acyclicity of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012057065
This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that effcient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing effciency to the weaker condition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332209
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010435707
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to their preferences when transfers are not allowed, and studies the tradeoff between fairness and efficiency in the class of strategy-proof mechanisms. The main finding is that for strategy-proof...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010438227
Ostrovsky [10] develops a theory of stability for a model of matching in exogenously given networks. For this model a … generalization of pairwise stability, chain stability, can always be satisfied as long as agents’ preferences satisfy same side … structure and (cooperative) solution concepts. The main structural condition is an acyclicity notion that rules out the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270419
This paper studies the possibility of strategy-proof rules yielding satisfactory solutions to matching problems …. Alcalde and Barberá (1994) show that effcient and individually rational matching rules are manipulable in the one …-to-one matching model. We pursue the possibility of strategy-proof matching rules by relaxing effciency to the weaker condition of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003397473
implements the full set of stable matchings in the existence of stability, and it ends up with Pareto Optimal matching in the … stability theorem fails for the roommate problem. In this paper, we propose a new mechanism for the roommate problem. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011716017