This paper sheds light on an empirical controversy about the effect of competition on price discrimination. We introduce individual demand uncertainty into Hotellingś model of product differentiation and show that firms offer advance purchase discounts. Consumers choose between an early...

When products are sold in advance, i.e. prior to consumption, consumers trade off an early, uninformed purchase at a low price against a late, informed purchase at a high price. This paper considers the effect of market structure on the prevalence of advance selling. We show that in an...

This article provides a tractable model of inter-temporal price-discrimination by heterogeneous firms, imperative for our understanding of advance purchase markets in the wake of entry. The pricing schedule of a more efficient entrant is found to differ systematically from the pricing schedule...

We propose an imperfect information model for the expectations of macroeconomic forecasters that explains differences in average disagreement levels across forecasters by means of cross sectional heterogeneity in the variance of private noise signals. We show that the forecaster-specific...

Recent research has shown that the standard labor matching model hasdifficulties in reproducing the co-movement patterns observed in US data. Thisis due to the fact that the standard model lacks sufficient propagation of shocks.This paper shows that refining the informational structure of the...

Recent research has shown that the standard labor matching model hasdifficulties in reproducing the co-movement patterns observed in US data. Thisis due to the fact that the standard model lacks sufficient propagation of shocks.This paper shows that refining the informational structure of the...

We study the propagation of nominal shocks in a dispersed information economy where firms learn from and respond to information generated by their activities in product and factor markets. We prove the existence of a "Hayekian benchmark", defined by conditions under which imperfect information...

We consider an economic model of child development with multiple stages. Due to incomplete information, parents are not able to tailor their investments to their child's type when the child is young. We show that incomplete information weakens the importance of early investments in children when...

Applying unawareness belief structures introduced in Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013a), we develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are extended naturally from lower to higher awareness levels and restricted from higher to lower...

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for many potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We develop Bayesian games with unawareness, define equilibrium, and prove existence. We show how equilibria are...