This paper provides four axioms that uniquely characterize the sequential Raiffa solution proposed by Raiffa (1951, 1953) for two-person bargaining games. Three of these axioms are standard and are shared by several popular bargaining solutions. They suffice to characterize these solutions on...

This article provides an exact non-cooperative foundation of the sequential Raiffa solution for two person bargaining games. Based on an approximate foundation due to Myerson (1997) for any two-person bargaining game (S,d) an extensive form game G^S^d is defined that has an infinity of weakly...

For any abstract bargaining problem a non-cooperative one stage strategic game is constructed whose unique dominant strategies Nash equilibrium implements the Nash solution of the bargaining problem. -- Nash programm ; implementation ; Nash bargaining solution

First via a counter example it is shown that the Proposition 3 of Anbarci & Sun (2013) is false. Then a gap and a mistake in their proof are identified. Finally, a modified version of their Proposition 3 is stated and proved.

These notes consist of two parts. In the first one I present a counter example to Proposition 3 of Anbarci & Sun (2013). In the second part I propose a correction based on an axiom similar to one used by Salonen (1988) in the first axomatization of the Discrete Raiffa solution.

The alternating offers game due to Rubinstein (1982) had been used by Binmore (1980) and by Binmore et.al. (1986) to provide via its unique subgame perfect equilibrium an approximate non-cooperative support for the Nash bargaining solution of associated cooperative two-person bargaining games....