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On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation in a general class of social choice problems
Goeree, Jacob K.; Kushnir, Alexey - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009491243
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A geometric approach to mechanism design
Goeree, Jacob K.; Kushnir, Alexey - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009491244
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Aggregating infinitely many probability measures
Herzberg, Frederik - 2014
wishes to evaluate her options on the basis of a single aggregate prior via classical expected utility theory (a … preference and judgment aggregation theory which show that the aggregate of several probability measures should not be conceived … McConway's (Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 76, no. 374, pp. 410-414, 1981) theory of probabilistic …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010234048
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Balanced Bayesian mechanisms
Aspremont, Claude d'; Crémer, Jacques; Gérard-Varet, … - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001712787
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Some limitations of virtual Bayesian implementation
Serrano, Roberto (contributor); Vohra, Rajiv (contributor) - 2000 - Rev
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001508179
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Type diversity and virtual Bayesian implementation
Serrano, Roberto (contributor); Vohra, Rajiv (contributor) - 2000 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001517622
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A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
Serrano, Roberto (contributor); Vohra, Rajiv (contributor) - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001675328
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On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation in a general class of social choice problems
Goeree, Jacob K.; Kushnir, Alexey - 2011
We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private values. We provide a short and constructive proof that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009739162
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A geometric approach to mechanism design
Goeree, Jacob K.; Kushnir, Alexey - 2011
theory. The optimal mechanism can subsequently be derived from the support function using Hotelling's lemma. We first assume …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009741027
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A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - 2002
We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in pure strategies for environments satisfying no-total-indifference. A social choice function in such environments is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisfies incentive compatibility and a condition we term...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318865