Showing 1 - 10 of 11,061
best we mean that one can find mechanisms that satisfy efficiency of decision, dominant strategy incentive compatibility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538720
no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency … experiment participants, and that allowing face-to-face pre-play communication increases efficiency although still not to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012029781
no equilibrium achieving full efficiency. In the experiment, we vary the proportion of naive traders by introducing … computerized players. We find that full efficiency is not achieved in the experiment with or without naive traders, and efficiency … experiment participants, and that allowing face-to-face pre-play communication increases efficiency although still not to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503
. Constraining choices increases segregation and affects the stability and efficiency of the final allocation. Remarkably, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279488
sufficient conditions for efficiency in terms of cyclical monotonicity. The n-player group version always yields efficiency. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279529
efficiency only if they are dictatorial. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536335
efficiency only if they are dictatorial. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014533360
We analyze the performance of various communication protocols in a generalization of the Crawford-Sobel (1982) model of cheap talk that allows for multiple receivers. We find that whenever the sender can communicate informatively with both receivers by sending private messages, she can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291984
This note considers a bargaining environment with two-sided asymmetric information and quasilinear preferences in which parties select bargaining mechanism after learning their valuations. I demonstrate that sometimes the buyer achieves a higher ex-ante payoff if the bargaining mechanism is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333947
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit to not renegotiating any mechanism. That is, we allow the principal, after observing the outcome of a mechanism to renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946258